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Chapter 18
Loss and Damage in the Rapidly
Changing Arctic
Mia Landauer and Sirkku Juhola
Abstract Arctic climate change is happening much faster than the global average.
Arctic change also has global consequences, in addition to local ones. Scientific
evidence shows that meltwater of Arctic sources contributes to sea-level rise signifi-
cantly while accounting for 35% of current global sea-level rise. Arctic communities
have to find ways to deal with rapidly changing environmental conditions that are
leading to social impacts such as outmigration, similarly to the global South. Interna-
tional debates on Loss and Damage have not addressed the Arctic so far. We review
literature to show what impacts of climate change are already visible in the Arctic,
and present local cases in order to provide empirical evidence of losses and damages
in the Arctic region. This evidence is particularly well presented in the context of
outmigration and relocation of which we highlight examples. The review reveals a
need for new governance mechanisms and institutional frameworks to tackle Loss
and Damage. Finally, we discuss what implications Arctic losses and damages have
for the international debate.
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18.1 Introduction
Dangerous climate change increases the need for emergency preparedness mech-
anisms, disaster risk responses, and climate adaptation strategies in case of losses
and damages. To avoid dangerous climate change, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has called for action within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner (UNFCCC 1992, Article II).
Crowley (2011) has criticised this Article II because it does not consider the
international human rights principles when interpreting what “dangerous” climate
changemeans. For example, the ability of ecosystems to recover naturally has already
been compromised in many places in the Arctic, and these changes are threatening
food security and traditional livelihoods already, especially those of indigenous peo-
ples. Liability and compensation are under debate in international climate policy
discussions (Huggel et al. 2015). Financing mechanisms to support adaptation or
transformative actions can be provided from local, national, regional and interna-
tional sources. However, this requires consensus between responsible parties and
potential beneficiaries. It is also problematic that losses and damages cannot always
be compensated by technical or financial support, if they include, for example, loss
of culture and tradition. In these international debates, little attention and support
has been given to Arctic vulnerable communities so far. These communities have to
find ways to deal with rapidly changing environmental conditions, either by adapting
or taking actions that can lead to social impacts similarly to global South, such as
outmigration (e.g. Wolsko and Marino 2016).
Arctic climate change is happening much faster than the global average (Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment 2005; IPCC 2007; AMAP 2017). According to AMAP
(2017: 3), “The Arctic … has been warming more than twice as rapidly as the world
as a whole for the past 50 years”. The Arctic has often been referred to as “the
canary in the coalmine” (Chinowsky et al. 2010), “climate hotspot” (Hare et al.
2011), or “harbinger of change” (Carmack et al. 2012). The Arctic represents a place
where the impacts of climate change are already visible. Both scientific evidence
(e.g., attribution studies and vulnerability analyses of Arctic communities, including
the most recent reports of the IPCC) and traditional knowledge (e.g., indigenous
discourses and field observations of Arctic residents) indicate that climate change
has severe impacts on theArctic and risks and impacts also have global consequences.
Recent scientific evidence shows that meltwater of Arctic sources contributes to sea-
level rise significantly while accounting for 35% of current global sea level rise
(AMAP 2017).
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According to Carmack et al. (2012) examining the Arctic is particularly important
for four reasons. First, understanding change in the Arctic may reveal lessons of
how change happens in complex systems and improve our understanding how to
deal with these. Second, changes already taking place in the Arctic are likely to
have irreversible impacts regionally and locally, leading to limited possibilities of
communities to adapt, and significant consequences to the global economy as well.
Globally, Arctic climate change has been estimated to cost between 9 and 70 trillion
U.S. dollars over the period 2010–2100 (AMAP 2017:13). Third, climate change is
advancing faster in the Arctic than anywhere else, and finally, responses to climate
change through adaptation are manifold, and can be tested in the Arctic in the face
of rapidly approaching tipping points.
In this chapter, we examine what “dangerous climate change” means in the Arctic
context, by identifying critical risks and impacts in the region in general, and then
presenting cases from the literature that are beyond Arctic communities’ capacity
to adapt, in particular. The examples provide evidence on Arctic regions’ need for
institutional support to cope with the consequences of climate change, despite being
part of developed countries. So far, neither the United Nations Climate Change Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) nor the subsidiary bodies under the UNFCCC have
discussed Arctic climate changes in detail (Duyck 2015a, b). Yet, changes already
affect Arctic communities, questioning whether they are in fact bearing a “dispropor-
tionate or under abnormal burden” (cf. UNFCCC, Article II). Examples of losses and
damages more broadly are climate change affecting critical infrastructure and tradi-
tional livelihoods (Bronen 2015) as these harms can affect societies across genera-
tions (Sejersen 2012;Himes-Cornell andHoelting 2015). Similar actual and potential
losses and damages are under discussion in developing countries too. Their capability
to adapt to change or transform their livelihoods to something that still allows them
to maintain their land, livelihoods and culture, is critical to affected communities. If
this is not possible, and the residents have to leave and abandon their livelihoods,
they are faced by Loss and Damage in its “narrow” sense. Thus, we review Arctic
studies to understand what losses and damages mean in the Arctic context, what are
global consequences of Arctic change, and what implications these changes have for
the international Loss and Damage debate.
18.2 Rationale for Including the Arctic in the Loss
and Damage Debate
Internationally, the debate on Loss and Damage has predominantly concentrated
on discussing the risks and impacts of climate change on developing countries so
far. International climate negotiations have been the main arena and as other chap-
ters in this volume show, a consensus on the definition of Loss and Damage is yet
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to emerge (Mechler and Schinko 2016; see introduction by Mechler et al. 2018;
chapter by James et al. 2018). A broad definition in the literature makes a distinction
between avoidable, unavoided and unavoidable impacts of climate change, where
“irreversibility” refers to ‘losses’ and “impacts that can be alleviated” refer to ‘dam-
ages’ (see Mechler and Schinko 2016: 290). In essence, this means that Loss and
Damage can be narrowly defined as the “residual, adverse impacts of climate change
beyond what can be addressed bymitigation and adaptation” (see Huggel et al. 2015:
454). Here, we employ this definition of Loss and Damage related to climate change
impacts that are unavoidable.
18.2.1 Little Responsibility of Emissions
On a global scale, Arctic traditional and indigenous lifestyles have hardly contributed
to greenhouse gas emissions, although traditional livelihoods of the Arctic commu-
nities take place in high-emitting first world countries, and fossil fuels extracted
from Arctic regions contribute to global GHGs and serve all countries (Pechsiri et al.
2010). Global mitigation responsibility of all countries, developed countries, emerg-
ing economies and developing countries, is not only important to reduce vulnerability
of communities of global South but also of the Arctic communities. This has been
shown by empirical evidence in the IPCC 4th assessment synthesis report (IPCC
2007).
18.2.2 Identifying the Most Vulnerable by Following Human
Rights Principles
From the climate justice point of view (see chapter byWallimann-Helmer et al. 2018),
and as considered by Inuit political leaders (see Ford 2009; Crowley 2011), climate
change is primarily a human rights issue because it puts the ecosystem services-based
traditional livelihoods at risk, and leads to social and economic impacts inArctic com-
munities (Maldonado et al. 2013). Marginal livelihoods, especially those located in
Arctic coastal areas, face both slow-onset and extreme events that heavily affect crit-
ical infrastructure, and cause harm to local and traditional livelihoods (Huggel et al.
2015). Some traditional ways of living, for example, can no longer be practiced due
to changes in sea ice conditions (Sejersen 2012; Shearer 2012; Bronen and Chapin
III 2013; Bronen 2015). Yet, international roles and responsibilities to deal with Loss
and Damage are not clear, and current national level legal frameworks seem not to
provide “optimal” solutions to support adaptation of vulnerable Arctic communi-
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ties—and in fact, even limit adaptation in many ways. According to the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, nation state governments have
the responsibility to enhance protection of vulnerable groups, minorities, and sup-
port work to advance human rights (ICISS 2001, cited in Bronen 2015). But still,
the UNFCCC Parties are not meeting their international legal obligations under the
Article II (see Crowley 2011; chapter by Simlinger and Mayer 2018).
18.2.3 Unequal Distribution of Risks and Limits
to Adaptation
In the current Loss and Damage debate of the UNFCCC, the global North is consid-
ered to have high responsibility and liability for dealing with climate-related risks
affecting vulnerable communities in the South. In general, countries in the global
North are considered to have high adaptive capacity, due to national and regional
financial and technological resources that should also support sustainable trans-
formation of societies. But as the case in many southern regions too, neither are
climate-related risks distributed equally among the population and geographically in
the northern circumpolar region, nor do those in need necessarily have access to these
resources (Larsen et al. 2014). Also, considering unforeseen future conditions, Arctic
ecosystems cannot adapt to climate change naturally, and this hampers the provision
of ecosystem services, which provide the basis for traditional livelihoods (White
et al. 2007; Larsen et al. 2014). Climate change forces people to make choices and
face situations that lead to radical, but not necessarily sustainable transformations of
society (Sejersen 2012). Marino (2012) has pointed out that federal, state and local
authorities in the US identify today nearly all 200 Alaskan native villages as being
“under threat” or “immanent threat” due to erosion and/or flooding. To tackle these
kinds of challenges Arctic communities would need decision-making power, access
to information and financial resources. One example is relocation actions, which are
costly and require careful planning in order to lead to positive outcomes (Lopez-Carr
and Marter-Kenyon 2015). Especially Arctic populations in remote locations need
institutional and financial support and assistance in adaptation planning (Ford 2009;
Dengler et al. 2014) to be able to successfully implement adaptation actions that
should end up with positive outcomes—forced or poorly planned relocation actions
cannot be considered as such.
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18.3 Review of the Impacts of Climate Change
and Vulnerability in the Arctic
We conducted a systematic literature review of Arctic scientific studies found
mainly in Scopus database. Out of 3,473Arctic studies we found 164 studies address-
ing issues related to risks and impacts of climate change that relate to losses and dam-
ages more broadly. Categories of these can be found in Table 18.1. We could also
identify examples that fit the narrow definition of Loss and Damage, while providing
examples of climate risks and impacts that are ‘beyond adaptation.’ Instead of trying
to identify all examples that belong to the “narrow” category, we selected examples
from the literature that have been found particularly relevant for the global South
and developing countries, and are also discussed in the international Loss and Dam-
age debate: relocation and outmigration. For instance, climate-induced migration is
explicitly covered in the United Nations Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC)
conferences, the Conference of the Parties (COP), and the Executive Committee
on the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM), which has a
mandate to establish a migration facility.
Based on the literature review, the impacts of climate change can be divided into a
number of different types from ecological to socio-cultural and economic, whereby
joint impacts can also reinforce eachother. For example, there are biophysical impacts
when changes in climate affect the biogeochemical cycles in the Arctic and change
the prevailing conditions in the region, which in turn affects the ability of Arctic
communities to engage in economic, social and cultural activities. Alternatively,
there are socio-economic developments that can amplify ecological impacts through
new migration patterns or use of natural resources, for example. Impacts can also
be described as local, regional or global, with the first two being climate change
impacts happening in the Arctic and the third impacts that occur elsewhere but have
consequences in the Arctic and vice versa.
Table 18.1 Categories of
Arctic studies
focusing on risks and impacts
of climate change (N=164).
Especially
the climate-induced
relocation and migration
studies provide indications of
Arctic Loss and Damage
Categories Number of
studies
Dangerous climate change: risks, hazards,
disasters, extreme events
13
Infrastructure impacts and costs 6
Climate-induced relocation and migration 18
Vulnerability, resilience, impacts, adaptation 70
Human rights, equity, climate justice, gender
issues, generations
8
Research tools and methods: monitoring,
assessments, use of traditional knowledge in
research
27
Human health impacts 22
Total 164
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Research on socio-economic impacts has also shown that biophysical changes are
impacting anthropogenic activities in the Arctic directly, but also indirectly through
increased economic interests, such as in mineral exploitation and other industrial
developments, affecting traditional land use and causing pollution. There are number
of strands in the impacts and vulnerability literature and many of these categories
touch upon the topics included in the international Loss and Damage debate, which
we place in seven loosely defined categories (Table 18.1). The classification is based
on the main focus of the studies as indicated by title, abstract and keywords. Studies
modelling the changes or impacts of climate change focus on the Arctic as a whole.
Smaller scale ecological or biological studies tend to be site-specific with varying
considerations given to their generalisability across areas. Themajority of studies that
address socio-economic aspects, either through vulnerability or adaptation, tend to
consider a specific community or country. As part of these studies, North American
analyses were very well represented whereas there were fewer studies from the
Nordic Arctic (Finland, Sweden, Norway) and Siberia (Russia).
Figure 18.1 presents these Arctic studies as a “keyword mining” visualisation
made by means of VOSviewer software. The term map is based on a text corpus
option to visualise the main topics found in the articles. The figure shows the essen-
tial keywords most frequently encountered terms related to Arctic climate impacts
and risks topic, extracted from the article titles and abstracts. 83 terms that met
the threshold of appearance 10 times were selected. The size of the circles indi-
cates frequencies of keywords. Circle colours indicate close relatedness of the terms
(substance-wise). The terms marked with the same colour form a cluster of related
terms that can be seen as a topic. Lines express co-occurrence of the terms between
the clusters either in the article title, or abstract, or both.
As can be seen from the terms that emerged, much focus has been placed on
research into impacts related to infrastructure and vulnerability. Both of these have
implications for the debate on Loss and Damage, even though the debate itself has
largely been ignored in the context of the Arctic. Studies have centred on identifying
the impacts of climate change on Arctic societies in terms of both infrastructure and
socio-economic conditions, and their ability to adapt. These analyses can be used to
identify to what extent communities are able to adapt or whether they will experience
losses and damages arising from impacts that they are not able to adapt to.
18.3.1 Biophysical Impacts
Since the publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it has been recently estimated that the decrease of
Arctic sea ice is more rapid than according to previous estimations (Hare et al. 2011)
and the Arctic melting will significantly affect sea level rise globally (AMAP 2017).
Climate change effects on sea ice-based ecosystems are likely to have significant
consequences, including possible extinction of some species (Johannessen andMiles
2011). Another significant long-term trend in the Arctic areas is the thaw of the
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permafrost, which contributes to the slow release of carbon in the atmosphere (Schuur
and Abbott 2011), resulting in global consequences.
It is worth noting that not all biophysical impacts are uniform and that the Arctic
covers many different types of landscapes and societies. There is a shift from tundra
to continental climate in Alaska, Canada and North-Eastern Russia and a shift from
continental to temperate climate in North America: these are examples of a global
decrease in cold areas and in Alaska and Siberia, which are on top facing the risk
of desertification (Spinoni et al. 2015). Other Arctic areas, such as western Siberia,
are facing hydrological risks and permafrost thaw causing floods and mudflows and
increasing the risks to industry and urban centres (Zemtsov et al. 2014).
There are slow-onset events, such as tundra decline, tundra shrubification, per-
mafrost thaw, tree line advance, deforestation, loss of palsamires inNordicArctic; the
Arctic region is also facing albedo changes and diminishing sea ice, soil and coastal
erosion, sea-level rise, and desertification. Further direct impacts are extreme events,
such as storms and wildfires, floods, and landslides. It is estimated that increases
in precipitation will affect snow events in Alaska and increase the likelihood of
avalanches and landslides in the mountainous areas (Hansen et al. 2014). All these
biophysical impacts can be disruptive to wildlife and ecosystems, and the provision
of ecosystem services, and cause serious damage to people and critical infrastructure
also, as well as emergency preparedness systems and monitoring systems (Crowley
2011). They can also cause impacts on (traditional) food and water security (White
et al. 2007), but also tourism (Lemelin et al. 2012). Arctic livelihoods and lifestyles
are closely connected to the environment, and dependent on the prevailing conditions
of ecosystem services. For example, risks associated with loss of sea ice and its con-
sequences on practicing traditional activities, such as seal hunting and ice fishing,
are increasing and local communities have to adapt to these changes (Giles et al.
2013), and if adaptation is not possible, try to move away.
18.3.2 Socio-economic Impacts
Further reading of the literature reveals that there are studies that focus on under-
standing and mapping socio-economic vulnerability of Arctic communities, soci-
eties, culture and lifestyles. Among these are studies that approach vulnerability
within a specific sector and focus on modeling or providing cost estimates related
to climate change impacts and adaptation. We also found several studies indicating
health impacts driven by climate change. For example, hydrological cycle changes
are an example of emergent changes that cause lack of ice for long periods of time in
Russia. This has health consequences because the people cannot access health ser-
vices and also the “social fabric” is being affected, according to Amstislavski et al.
(2013).
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The literature also shows evidence of socio-cultural consequences of climate
change in the case of relocation and climate-induced migration. These studies indi-
cate that across the Arctic regions, and especially in the coastal areas, climate change
increases the vulnerability of local and indigenous communities. It has already led
to outmigration (“climigration”) and related cultural loss and demographic changes
in the region. The interest in studying the Arctic from the perspectives of climate
justice, intra- and intergenerational issues has been growing, particularly in terms
of relocations and human rights. As outmigration and relocation can have multiple
negative consequences, the question remains whether these actions should be con-
sidered as adaptation, or whether they are rather ‘beyond adaptation,’ i.e. related to
Loss and Damage given that currently outmigration and relocation are key issues of
the international Loss and Damage debate.
18.3.3 Economic Models and Impact Analyses
Economic models and impact studies place emphasis on estimating potential local
impacts and costs (or costs and benefits) associated with climate change, mainly
in the context of Alaska, although there are some Nordic studies as well. These
studies focus on a variety impacts, such as coastal erosion (Radosalvjevic et al. 2015)
and temperature changes (Chinowsky et al. 2010). Many of the studies model the
impacts on infrastructure, for which the costs of climate change are likely to increase
significantly as conditions change (Instanes 2006; Larsen et al. 2008; Hatcher and
Forbes 2015). Arctic infrastructure is already tailored to specific conditions and
now maintenance and replacement costs under any adaptation scenario is likely to
increase about 10% (Chinowsky et al. 2010), so adaptation might technically be
possible, but it is too expensive. A number of economic studies estimates potential
damages either through modeling or by analysing historical events and its costs. It
is argued that there is a continuous need to monitor and develop responses through
emergency management (Brunner et al. 2004). Immediate impacts and related costs
due to damage on critical public infrastructure have been estimated and modeled
with an economic point of view towards losses and damages (e.g. Instanes 2006;
Larsen et al. 2008; Ford and Pearce 2010; Chinowsky et al. 2010; Karvetski et al.
2011; Radosavljevic et al. 2015). So, it is very simple to understand that if costs are
exceedingly high and financial resources not available, adaptation is not possible;
the residual risks and impacts remain ‘beyond adaptation,’ and thus belong under the
narrow definition of Loss and Damage.
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18.3.4 Societal Impacts
We also found studies that focus on understanding the socio-economic and cultural
vulnerabilities ofArctic communities in-depth. These studies provide a socio-cultural
angle on climate impacts, and include non-monetary impacts, such as loss of culture
and tradition. These are often case studies of specific communities undertaken with
ethnographic methods (e.g. Carothers et al. 2014). Many contributions in this field
focus on the role that traditional/indigenous knowledge has played in adaptation of
Arctic peoples in the past, yet find that the knowledge now is eroding, and affecting
their culture and traditions. We also found a strand of literature that takes a more
critical view on conceptualising vulnerability by stressing the historical background,
which reinforces current vulnerability and places barriers to adaptation in the future.
For example, due to a multitude of changes in the past and currently, traditional
knowledge has had to make place for wages, hunting regulations, for example, due
to colonialism in the past and due to ongoing industrial developments today (Cameron
2012).
However, studies which take into account traditional knowledge now seem to have
gained more importance in research to better understand Arctic change and adapta-
tion to it (e.g. Riedlinger and Berkes 2001; Maynard et al. 2010; Douglas et al. 2014;
Cuerrier et al. 2015; Vinyeta and Lynn 2013; Golden et al. 2015). Also, special
attention in this literature has been placed on recognising the impacts to indige-
nous communities and institutional frameworks related to strategies to deal with the
impacts, such as community-based adaptation strategies and participatory planning
(Tremblay et al. 2008; Hovelsrud and Smit 2010; Pearce et al. 2012; Champalle et al.
2015). As amatter of fact, the resources of indigenous communities to increase adap-
tive capacity have been diminishing due to reduced possibilities to make decisions
and practice traditional ways of living (Roberts and Andrei 2015) and consequently,
studies on outmigration (or “climigration”) and (forced) relocations have started to
emerge (Table 1).
The focus on vulnerability due to climate impacts has indeed drawn some cri-
tique for its narrow view. Many studies are considered to ignore the colonial legacy
in the Arctic and its effects in terms of inducing social change with negative impli-
cations (Cameron 2012; Whyte 2016). So, there are also new social, political and
economic settings emerging and “blocking” the traditional ways to adapt to changes,
as traditional livelihoods are now being regulated from “outside,” such as changes in
governance of resource use, land use, and land ownership. It has been proposed that
more public participation, co-management and self-governance of local communi-
ties is needed in decision-making and planning, and new (participatory) governance
mechanisms to tackle the transformation of the Arctic region (Nuttal 2007; Bronen
and Chapin III 2013). Ford et al. (2007) have argued that without financial support
provided by larger-scale actors, such as the UNFCCC, for example Inuit commu-
nities and regions cannot successfully adapt. Indigenous peoples often have limited
decision-making power, and both environmental and social changes are more rapid
than they have been before. Integrated understanding of science, people, and cross-
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scale information networks to increase Arctic resilience is needed to respond to the
rapid changes (Carmack et al. 2012) and identify what remains beyond adaptation,
i.e. Loss and Damage, and why.
In summary, this reviewed literature shows that many kinds of risks and impacts
on societies can already be seen in the Arctic, and some of them fall under the
“narrow” category of Loss and Damage, in the literature typically defined as the
“residual, adverse impacts of climate change beyond what is addressed bymitigation
and adaptation” (see Huggel et al. 2015: 454). Climatic changes affect societies that
are already much more vulnerable than the general population in these developed
countries. Arctic societies need to find options to tackle drivers of environmental,
economic, social and cultural transformation, but at the same time they also have to
find ways to deal with the residual losses and damages that are ‘beyond adaptation’
to climate change. In the next section we delve deeper into these ways by providing
examples.
18.4 Loss and Damage in the Context of the Arctic
Throughout the history, Arctic ecosystems and dependent local and indigenous com-
munities with varying needs, perceptions and values, have been adapting to climate
variability. However, due to rapid climate change and global change, limits to adap-
tation have started to emerge. The Arctic literature show limits to adaptation due to
institutional, political, organisational and jurisdictional factors hindering implemen-
tation of adaptation to climate impacts, leading to Loss and Damage. The threshold
of adaptation also depends on current socio-economic, cultural and political settings.
A schematic depiction is shown in Fig. 18.2. The Arctic examples of relocation and
migration show very well that due to negative societal and cultural impacts related
to these actions, they can be considered as being ‘beyond adaptation,’ i.e. Loss and
Damage.
Inadequate institutional and financial frameworks to deal with Loss and Dam-
age are considered to imply important challenges (Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon
2015). This becomes clear throughout the Arctic examples, albeit mainly fromNorth
America (Alaska) that highlight the need for new governance mechanisms and insti-
tutional frameworks to tackle climate change. One problem is, that sometimes not all
types of impacts are included in jurisdictional frameworks. For example, in case of
(climate change related) disaster mitigation, Bronen and Chapin III (2013) think that
one factor considering gaps in post-disaster and hazard mitigation statutory frame-
work is erosion. Even though it is one of the most significant climate change related
hazards in the region, it is not included in the official lists of major disasters, such
as in the Stafford Act in the US. Shearer (2012) studied climate adaptation assis-
tance in Kivalina, Alaska and found that indigenous communities face intra-national
inequalities while not receiving adaptation assistance, which is only available to
formal state actors. Another problem is insufficient allocation and availability of
financial resources. Bronen and Chapin III (2013) also found that resources are allo-
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cated for rebuilding homes as part of the post-disaster recoverymeasures only in their
current location, not in a new location. This creates a problem if the land is lost for
good, such as in the case of coastal erosion or sea level rise (see also Bronen 2015).
Full integration of hazard mitigation planning into comprehensive risk assessments
is considered expensive, and time intensive. Also, allocation of funding is based on
cost-benefit ratios which means that for example Alaskan communities, such as in
Newtok cannot compete for hazard mitigation funds due to their remote location and
low population density, which equals to high costs and low benefits (Bronen and
Chapin III 2013). These kinds of barriers (more examples in Table 18.2) represent
drivers of Loss and Damage because they hinder implementation of adaptation.
They act as limits to adaptation and can thus lead toLoss andDamage because they
prevent communities from taking action. Interpreted in this way, Loss and Damage
can arise not only from climate impacts per se, but also from the socio-economic
constraints that hinder adaptation of local communities.
In the next subsection, we present examples of relocation and outmigration in the
Arctic showing examples when adaptation in situ is not possible and leads to (forced)
relocation and outmigration and can cause societal and cultural Loss and Damage.
These examples provide evidence that with insufficient institutional, organisational
and jurisdictional support relocation and migration actions cannot be considered as
adaptation.
Fig. 18.2 Institutional and jurisdictional framework, as well as socio-economic, cultural and polit-
ical settings affect adaptation threshold of Arctic communities, and can be drivers of Loss and
Damage
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Table 18.2 Examples limiting Arctic communities to adapt to climate change
Examples preventing adaptation or leading to negative
consequences of adaptation actions
Author (publication year)
Inadequate institutional and financing mechanisms such as
federal funding procedures for disaster prevention and
recovery
Bronen (2015)
Disabilities to determine and evaluate when preventive
actions needed
Bronen (2015)
Slow implementation of actions or statutory and institutional
barriers in implementation
Bronen (2015)
Lacking governance framework for the evaluation of risks
and impacts
Bronen (2015)
Government funding does not reach Arctic communities Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon
(2015)
Inequity and injustice related to current actions Kingston and Marino (2010)
Mis- and under-representation of local voices in political
arenas
Marino (2012)
Lack of adaptation assistance when only available for formal
state actors
Shearer (2012)
Inadequate accommodation of climate change scenarios into
disaster risk protocols
Marino (2012)
Unclear responsibilities of government or lacking
government body to implement actions
Shearer (2012)
Lack of preventive disaster programs and funds Shearer (2012)
Missing international support regarding capacity building for
adaptation actions
Marino (2012), Shearer (2012)
Traditional and indigenous knowledge not considered in
planning actions
Shearer (2012)
Lacking networks of multiple and diverse organisations to
build adaptive capacity and balance between different
interest groups
Bronen (2015)
Migration strategies not considered in disaster risk reduction
and adaptation programs
Dengler et al. (2014)
Difficulties to monetise loss of health and social cohesion Dengler et al. (2014)
Unclear or inadequate allocation of funding for disaster
mitigation (for example, erosion not included, although it
can be one of the most significant hazards in some regions)
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
Full integration of hazard mitigation planning into
comprehensive risk assessments is considered too expensive
and time intensive
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
Allocation of funding often based on cost-benefit ratios
which leaves out remote communities with low population
densities (seen as high costs and low benefits)
Bronen and Chapin III (2013)
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18.4.1 Relocation and Outmigration as Adaptation or Part
of Loss and Damage?
At themoment, it is yet unclear towhether relocation is considered to be an adaptation
measure and thus it would be integrated in states’ adaptation strategies, or whether
it is something that needs to be undertaken separately when impacts are beyond
adaptation, i.e. part of the Loss and Damage agenda. As can be seen from above,
many Arctic regions are highly vulnerable to climate change and there are places
where adaptation is not possible for local communities. However, they are forced
to abandon their livelihoods and traditional residential areas due to increased risks
and lack of governance mechanisms and resources to manage risks. Bronen (2015)
argues that nation states are required to protect vulnerable populations from climate
change impactswithin its jurisdiction. But the literature reveals that nation states have
often failed to do so: relocation is considered a massive challenge for governments.
Our review shows that both perspectives on relocation can be found in the literature.
Relocations due to colonisation and natural disasters have been experienced in the
Arctic throughout the history, but now climate change also plays a more intense
role as a driver of relocations and outmigration. Several studies have found that
independent of the drivers of change, relocations will have effects on culture, and
maintenance of tradition. We illustrate the challenges of relocation by presenting an
example from the Alaskan village Kivalina, see Box 18.1.
Similar issues have been experienced in the other Alaskan regions King Island
and Shishmaref, that are also at risk of climate change and need to consider reloca-
tion. Relocation can also lead to a sense of loss of place and have emotional impacts
as found in the study based on King Islanders’ experiences (Kingston and Marino
2010). In the case of Shishmaref, Marino (2012) found that colonial history and
historical inequity is linked to contemporary exposure to hazards and vulnerability
of climate change. The author also identified mis- and under-representation of local
voices in political arenas to discuss relocation planning. According to Bronen (2015),
permanent relocation can be considered as one adaptation strategy only if culture and
traditions can be secured in the long-term, so the implementation of it requires new
governance tools. Currently existing institutional mechanisms are often considered
inadequate and unable to determine when preventive relocation is needed and how
it should be organised (Bronen 2015; see Box 18.1). Some disaster risk reduction
and adaptation programs do not necessarily consider migration strategies at all (Den-
gler et al. 2014). Given that it appears that existing mechanisms, i.e. adaptation, is
insufficient, one could label this as part of Loss and Damage.
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Box 18.1 Why is community relocation so challenging: Example from Kivalina, Alaska
Kivalina is a village in theNorthwestArcticBorough inAlaska, theUnited States. It has about
400 inhabitants (mostly Inupiats) that are now being forced to relocate due to risks of rising
sea levels and coastal erosion and also impacts of permafrost thaw and heavy snowstorms
(Gregg 2010; Washington Post 2015; NOAA 2017).
The village has been planning relocations for 20 years already, detailed in the Kivalina
Relocation Master Plan published in 2006. Despite this, potential relocation options have
not been considered suitable, due to high costs, social and cultural objections or because the
sites under discussion are geotechnically inappropriate (Gregg 2010). Efforts to respond to
climate impacts through adaptation have been made: such as building a rock revetment to
postpone the relocation in 2010. The decision on relocation is to be made in the upcoming
decade (NOAA 2017). Difficulties in financing relocation is a common problem. In Kivalina,
relocation has been estimated to cost between 95 and 125 million US dollars (IAW 2009
cited in Lynn and Donoghue 2011).
The Alaskan ecosystem services-based communities have been able to adapt to changing
conditions in the past, but institutional, financial and political barriers have hindered local
communities to participate in decision-making—examples of these are lacking government
agency in charge of relocation, and funding allocated to disasters (e.g. for rebuilding) but
not for relocation (ADN 2016).
Forced relocation can lead to cultural damage, such as loss of traditional livelihoods (Lynn
and Donoghue 2011). It is hard to put a price to cultural loss, but efforts have been made to
maintain the culture and traditions of Kivalina residents, despite relocation. This is done, for
example, by creating projects that enable the communities to share thoughts about local ways
of life and locate, connect and educate new relocation partners and networking with global
community to shape the discourse on climate displacement (see: www.relocate-ak.org).
Fig. 18.3 Risk and Indigenous Peoples in Alaska
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In the following examples from the literature, insufficient allocation of funding is
driving Loss and Damage. Lopez-Carr and Marten-Kenyon (2015) studied manage-
ment of climate-induced resettlements in the United States’ territory of the Arctic
and found that although governments have spent considerable amounts of money on
erosion control nationally, funding has not reached the Arctic communities. Also in
the case of Kivalina, financing coastal erosion protection has failed, and at the same
time tens of thousands of people in Alaska’s native villages are under threat due to
damages to water supply and waste-storage systems that affect food and water secu-
rity (ibid.). Whether the discussion is about climate refugees or climate migrants,
there is a need for an effective institutional framework to reduce bureaucracy to allo-
cate resources, access funding and provide technical assistance at the community
level (Dengler et al. 2014).
In countries like the United States, governments have resources for disaster pre-
paredness, insurance payouts and infrastructure repairs, but there is no governance
framework to evaluate climate change risks and impacts and the needs for relocation
actions (Bronen 2015). Dengler et al. (2014) state that lacking access to finance cre-
ates one of the main constraints for communities to take action and leads to inability
to take lead on disaster risk responses. For example, building of new infrastructure,
which is considered very costly especially in remote locations such as in the Arctic, is
difficult. Sometimes resources are being allocated to technical solutions rather than
solutions where potential and obstacles for organised relocation, and other measures
are considered more holistically and sustainably, as revealed by the literature review.
Other challenges are the difficulties to monetise loss of health or social cohesion,
and excluding indigenous knowledge in planning of disaster risk and adaptation
schemes. Furthermore, inequity and injustice in climate risk governance characterise
Loss and Damage from climate change. This is already known from developing
countries experience (see chapters by Wallimann-Helmer and Serdeczny 2018).
18.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we reviewed the Arctic risk, vulnerability and impacts literature in
order to find evidence that losses and damages are distributed across very different
geographical areas and affect vulnerable communities in the Arctic as well. The role
of the Arctic has changed due to climate change: enormous resources have become
available and land and sea transport has become easier due to less ice and snow,
and better technology to access the areas and natural resources (oil and gas, and
minerals, for instance). The Arctic has become a common good, serving various
needs of the global community. But Arctic indigenous communities are among the
least responsible for climate change and they are facing harm caused by economic
developments, those that are mainly driven by climate change directly, and indirectly
by easier access to natural resources at the same time, leading to environmental and
social impacts (Maldonado et al. 2013).
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Why should we include the Arctic region in the Loss and Damage debate? One
answer is that if socio-economic indicators were compared between Inuit regions and
Small Island Developing States, also many of the Inuit regions would be considered
as “developing” regions and should gain assistance from the UNFCCC for instance
in form of an international fund (Ford 2009). In Kivalina, Alaska, the communities
are considered as first victims of climate change, facing also migration pressures
and displacement, which can lead to political instability, and cultural loss, similar to
examples from developing regions such as the Maldives (Wolsko and Marino 2016).
Because of direct impacts and relocations, other, indirect impacts have increased,
such as post-traumatic disorders affecting health and wellbeing. Even though the
people can survive disasters by relocation, there are still differences between indi-
viduals regarding how well, if at all, they can adapt, due to differences in health,
cultural integrity and sense of place (ibid.) Although sometimes seen as an adaptation
strategy, outmigration has caused problems because young generations are “pushed”
away from their land, and traditional livelihoods are eroding (Himes-Cornel and
Hoelting 2015). In other cases, such as shown in Newtok, Alaska, relocation plan-
ning has been going on for so long that one generation has experienced it, but still it
has not lead to implementation of relocation actions (Bronen and Chapin III 2013).
The case of Kivalina shows clearly that, although the community is located within a
developed country, it is vulnerable, but it is not getting the assistance it would need
from the state and internationally. There are examples showing that, once relocated,
there is no turning back. This is when the land has been literally lost due to sea level
rise, for example.
As found in many local studies from the Arctic, the current institutional and
financial frameworks are insufficient to tackle the consequences of climate risks and
impacts, leading to Loss and Damage. Furthermore, inclusion of local communities
in planning and decision-making is lacking (Marino 2012; Lopez-Carr and Marten-
Kenyon 2015). It is also problematic that indigenous communities are not always
considered as part of nation states and thus, do not enjoy the same rights as the
general population, which raises questions around ethical aspects (see Huggel et al.
2015). We found several legitimacy and justice issues that support our argument
that Arctic Loss and Damage should be discussed in the international climate policy
arena. This includes (re-) interpretation of human rights principles, identification
of roles and responsibilities, liability, and compensation mechanisms, as well as a
need for international institutional support to reduce limits to adaptation. There is a
lack of a proper international institutional framework and lack of local capacity to
organise relocation (e.g. Dengler et al. 2014; Maldonado et al. 2013). On the other
hand, forced relocation is one consequence ofweak risk governancemechanisms, but
relocations represent actions that could be supported nationally and internationally
to respond to climate risks if guided by international actors and implemented by
Arctic communities themselves, who have the local knowledge to reduce negative
consequences to culture and society.
Lack of financial resources is one of the main factors why relocation or building
new infrastructure cannot be implemented. The costs of relocation or rebuilding and
new technology in the Arctic are very high considering the remote location and other
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construction-related difficulties. Furthermore, some indigenous communities do not
even have cash economies. Although economic losses have been calculated forArctic
villages and cities, and adaptive climate cost models have been created (e.g. Chi-
nowski et al. 2010) regarding damages to physical assets such as infrastructure (e.g.
Larsen et al. 2008; Chinowsky et al. 2010), more information on costs of relocations,
health impacts and especially non-economic losses is needed (Roberts and Andrei
2015). In addition to financial and technical issues the remaining question is social
justice: how to maintain viability of the communities and how viability is actually
perceived by different communities (Sejersen 2012).
According to Duyck (2015a, b), the UNFCCC has not yet considered Arctic vul-
nerability issues in the international debate on Loss andDamage, and this was still the
case in 2018. Thus, the responsibility of Arctic states themselves should be clarified:
they should make sure the voices of Arctic vulnerable communities will be heard and
communicated in international climate policy negotiations. Also, Arctic States and
the Arctic Council should clarify and improve their national communications and
the statements from ministers at UNFCCC deliberations. So far, Arctic states have
not sufficiently considered Arctic Loss and Damage issues, and the Arctic Council
has not been represented sufficiently in the Arctic states’ documents and statements
presented to international bodies (ibid.).
Based on the empirical evidence of Arctic literature, we consider that the inter-
national Loss and Damage debate should include the Arctic as an example when
considering what “vulnerable” and “dangerous climate change” means and what
should be taken into account when trying to reduce vulnerability. For example, non-
economic losses and ways to measure these are also relevant to the Arctic, such as
loss of sense of place and belonging (Roberts and Andrei 2015), and loss of culture
and traditions, but they are not adequately considered in the current international
Loss and Damage debate. If the international human rights principles lense were
to be used to define the vulnerable, then violations of these rights regarding Arc-
tic indigenous communities would be evident, based on the results of our literature
review. More in-depth local level studies are needed to examine in detail what is
perceived as “dangerous climate change”. According to Sejersen (2012), the ways
Arctic societies perceive transformations in society and seek for opportunities to
adapt to change are very heterogeneous; this is owing, among others, to different
histories of colonialism or different types of livelihoods practiced in the Arctic, but
also due to different values and perceptions, as well as cultural backgrounds.
Under the conditions of rapid change in theArctic, current institutions and govern-
ment mechanisms are not found sufficient to deal with these multiple challenges and
dynamics of change: climate change, deterioration of environment, pressure of new
industries and businesses entering the Arctic region, and intra- and inter-generational
changes for example when outmigration causes unbalanced age and gender popula-
tions in remaining communities. Furthermore, the climate refugee problem can first
be seen locally (local responsibility to tackle with), but it will have international con-
sequences (global responsibility) and needs international attention and rethinking of
relocation policies.
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It has been argued that in order to understand limits to adaptation, the tradi-
tional instrumental and management-oriented view of adaptation in social systems
should be revisited (Sejersen 2012). Nowadays, climate change is used as a platform
to address issues of justice, development and self-determination, which are issues
already known from the past, where, however, scales, causations, and agency dif-
fered as pointed out by Sejersen (2012). In case of adaptation (whether due to climate
change or other changes), the focus is on moving from “how to adapt”, to “who to
become” when adapting (ibid:195). One question should be added to this list: what
happens ‘beyond adaptation’? But what these changes and impacts of climate change
in the Arctic mean globally is still unknown to many. What we know is that more
knowledge and resources to deal with climate change impacts faced by vulnerable
communities is needed and learning from the Arctic could be a forerunner case for
the international debate on Loss and Damage.
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